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1
In 1970, Wiesner [1] wrote a highly innovative paper about quantum cryptography [2] , [3] . In his paper, he also introduced the concept of Multiplexing, which was later rediscovered by Rabin, [4] and is now usually called Oblivious Transfer (OT). Let us briefly describe the OT protocol: 1 -Alice knows one bit λ, where λ is either 1 or −1 [5]. 2 -Bob obtains bit λ from Alice with probability 0.5. 3 -Bob knows whether or not he obtained bit λ. 4 -Alice does not learn whether or not Bob obtained bit λ.
In this letter, we propose a very efficient protocol for quantum oblivious transfer which is secure even against cheaters with unlimited computing power, if we assume that Bob can not store the bit for an arbitrarily long period of time. It is worth noting that none of the known non-quantum protocols for oblivious transfer are perfectly secure; they all allow one among Alice or Bob to cheat without risk of detection if he or she can break some unproved cryptographic assumptions.
Before proceeding, it is useful to review some elementary features of quantum mechanics. We consider an unstable source emitting pairs of entangled Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (EPR) [8] particles. We take the z axis along the direction of the flight of the particles, and the x and the y axes along any two directions perpendicular to the z axis. For a pair of particles in the EPR state | φ = 1 √ 2 (|↑↑ + |↓↓ ), the expected value of the product of the spin of the particles along two arbitrary axes a and b in the xy plane is [9] φ | σ
where σ a 1 is the spin of the first particle along axis a, σ b 2 is the spin of the second particle along axis b, and θ a (θ b ) is the angle between axis a b and the x axis. Thus the spin of the first particle along the x axis, m x 1 , is perfectly correlated with the spin of the second particle along the same axis, i.e., m x 1 m x 2 = 1. However, the spin of the first particle along the y axis is perfectly anticorrelated with the spin of the second particle along the same axis, i.e, m 
With the above in mind, we now proceed to describe the following protocol: (1) Alice and Bob agree that the bit λ is encoded in the product of the spin of the first and the second particles along the x axis (m (4) Alice asks Bob if his measurements have been successful. If he says no, then she goes to step 2. If he says yes, then she considers the following two cases: (I) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set A. If he says no, then she goes to (II). If he says yes (but of course he does not tell her along which axes he performed his measurements), and if she has chosen one of the four state | α , or | α ′ , or | β , or | β ′ , then she tells him that the protocol has not been successful, and she goes to step (2). But if she has chosen one of the four states | φ , or | φ ′ , or | ψ , or | ψ ′ , then she tells him only one of the following four alternatives:
(II) Alice asks Bob if his measurement belongs to set B. If he says yes, and if she has chosen one of the four state | φ , or | φ ′ , or | ψ , or | ψ ′ , then she tells him the protocol has not been successful, and she goes to step (2) . But if she has chosen one of the four states | α , or | α ′ , or | β , or | β ′ , then she tells him only one of the following four alternatives:
Theorem: Assuming that Bob can not store the bit until step 4 (when Alice asks him whether his measurement belongs to set A or B), the above oblivious transfer protocol is secure even against cheater with unlimited computing power.
Proof: First we consider Alice's strategy. We assume that Alice has chosen one of the four state | φ , or | φ ′ , or | ψ , or | ψ ′ , and Bob's measurement belongs to set A, i.e., he has measured m 
But
where (5) follows from the fact that Alice chooses any state with probability 1 4 , (6) follows from the symmetry of the problem, and (7) follows from the standard rules of quantum mechanics. Substituting the above formulas in Eq. (4), we obtain
Similar argument shows that
Thus p m 
Now the probability that Bob learns the value of λ is 1 2 [ p (m 
Note that the maximum value of the RHS of (13) is 3 4 . Thus the best strategy for Bob is to measure the spins of both particles either along the same axis. In particular, if Bob does not cheat and measures the spins of both particles either along the x-axis or along the y-axis, then he obtains maximum information about the value of the OT bit λ.
Having demonstrated that if Alice chooses one of the four states | φ , or | φ ′ , or | ψ , or | ψ ′ , and if Bob's measurement belongs to set A, then the OT protocol can be implemented successfully, we now consider the other alternative. We assume that Alice has chosen one of the four state | α , or | α ′ , or | β , or | β ′ , and Bob's measurement belongs to set B, i.e., he has measured m If Bob measures the spin of the first particle along the y axis, and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of the first particle along the −x axis, and the spin of the second particle along y axis, then he does not learn any information about λ, since α | σ If Bob measures the spin of the first particle along the y axis, and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spins of the first particle along the −x axis, and the spin of the second particle along y axis, then he does not learn any information about λ, since α
the spin of the first particle along -x axis and spin of the second particle along the y-axis, then he learns the value of λ. However, if he measures the spin of of the first particle along the y axis and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he does not learn any information about the value of λ, since α ′ | σ However, if he measures the spin of of the first particle along the y axis and spin of the second particle along the x axis, then he does not learn any information about the value of λ, since
Bob is honest, then the OT protocol can succeed without any difficulty (see above). However, if Bob is dishonest, the same argument as before shows that he does not gain any additional information by cheating. Thus the OT protocol is secure even against cheaters with unlimited computing power.
There is another flavor of OT which is called one-out-of-two oblivious transfer. The goal of this protocol is: 1 -Alice has two bits λ 1 and λ 2 where λ 1 (or λ 2 ) is either 1 or −1. 2 -Bob chooses to obtain either bit λ 1 or λ 2 . 3 -Bob knows whether or not he has obtained the bit. 4 -Alice does not learn which bit Bob has chosen. Less formally, Alice has two bits. Bob can get only one of them, and Alice does not learn which bit Bob obtained.
This protocol can be implemented by (1) Alice and Bob agree that λ 1 is encoded in m The same argument that was used for quantum OT can be used to prove that Bob does not gain any additional information by setting his polarizer at other angles. Thus the one-out-of-two OT protocol is secure even against cheaters with unlimited computing power.
